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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ADJOINING LANDOWNERs-RIGHT TO OBSTRUCT LIGHT, AIR, OR
VIEW-MALICIOUS MoTIVE AS BASIS OF INJUNTION TO RESTRAIN
ERECTION OF SPITE FENCE AS NUISANcE.-The only decision' since
1928 on the precise question of "spite fences ' 2 in a jurisdiction
where the subject is not regulated by statute was recently ren-
dered by the Supreme Court of South Dakota. In Racich v.
Mastrovich,s a case of first impression, that court adopted the
Michigan rule as stated in Burke v. Smith,4 that a fence erected
maliciously and with no other purpose than to shut out the light
I The obstructions complained of in Ash v. Tate, 73 F. (2d) 518 (1935),
and DeMers v. Graupner, 186 Ark. 214, 53 S. W. (2d) 8 (1932), were held
not to be spite fences.
2 A "spite fence" is defined as a fence erected for no benefit or pleasure to
the person erecting it, but solely with the malicious motive of injuring the
adjoining owner by shutting out his light, air and view.
3 273 N. W. 660, (S. D., 1937).
4 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. 838 (1888). Followed in Flaherty v. Moran, 81
Mich. 52, 45 N. W. 381, 8 L. R. A. 183 (1890); Kirkwood v. Finegan, 95
Mich. 543, 55 N. W. 457 (1893); Peck v. Roe, 110 Mich. 52, 67 N. W.
1080 (1896).
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and air from an adjoining owner's building is a nuisance5 which
equity will enjoin.
Prior to the Michigan decision, and for some time thereafter,
it was the general common law rule that a landowner might erect
on his own land a structure for the express purpose of shutting
out the light, air, and view from an adjoining landowner and
that the motive and intent of such person in erecting the struc-
ture was immaterial.6 This was based on the theory that the
rights of a landowner with respect to the use of his own land
are absolute. The Michigan decision, which was based on the
ground that every person in the use of his own property should
avoid injury to his neighbor as much as possible, and which
treated the rights of a landowner with regard to his neighbor as
relative rather than absolute, was unsupported by any other court
until 1909, when it was followed by the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in the case of Barger v. Barringer.7 Since that decision
the trend of authority has been to hold a spite fence actionable,
and the Michigan rule has been acknowledged by current writers
to be the modern rule.9
All of the decisions upholding the so-called modern rule are
founded on the doctrine, comparatively new in the law, that the
rights of landowners are relative and each owner must so use his
5 1 ... a balance of reasonable users as between owners of neighboring
properties must be struck, and any use of land by one of the parties which is
in violation of this balance, unreasonably interfering with the rights of enjoy-
ment of the others, is a nuisance. a wrong punished by the courts since the
beginning of the common law." W. F. Walsh, "Equitable Relief Against
Nuisance," 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 352 (1930).
6 Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17, 69 N. E. 548 (1904) ; Bordeaux v. Greene,
22 Mont. 254, 56 P. 218 (1899) ; Pickard v. Collins, 23 Barb. (N. Y.) 444
(1856); Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 261, 28 Am. Dec. 461 (1835);
Letts v. Kessler, 54 Ohio St. 73, 42 N. E. 765, 40 L. R. A. 177 (1896);
Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N. W. 308, 50 L. R. A. 305 (1900).
7 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 831 (1909).
8 Daniel v. Birmingham Dental Mfg. Co., 207 Ala. 659, 93 So. 652 (1922);
Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 129
(1912) ; Dunbar v. O'Brien, 117 Neb. 45, 220 N. W. 278, 58 A. L. R. 1033
(1928); Bush v. Mockett, 95 Neb. 552, 145 N. W. 1001, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.)
736 (1914) ; Hibbard v. Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, 158 P. 1158, L. R. A. 1916F
903 (1916).
9 "This decision [Burke v. Smith] thereafter became the rule in Michigan
without dissent, and has been quoted with approval and followed by the
courts of so many of the other states, that it may be considered as establish-
ing the modern rule." I Cooley on Torts (4th ed., 1932) 157, sec. 56.
"In view of the fact that for more than twenty years a right of action has
been held to lie in every case of spite fences arising under the common law,
it is submitted that the weight of modern authority favors the Michigan
view which appears clearly the sounder on principle and natural justice."
Note, 11 Va. L. Rev. 122 (1924), at p. 127. See also 11 R. C. L. 877.
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property as to avoid injury to the adjoining owner; hence the
question of malice becomes material, contrary to the generaliza-
tion long accepted in the law that "a malicious motive cannot
render actionable an act otherwise not actionable."' 0 It is on this
theory that some courts hold that a fence on one's own land, while
lawful in itself, is a nuisance when erected for malicious reasons
only. This has been recognized in courts of law in actions for
damages as well as in courts of equity in suits for injunction."
The argument that the problem is one for the legislatures of
the states rather than the courts, and that in the absence of stat-
utory authority there is no right to relief against a spite fence,
is answered by the Michigan court in Burke v. Smith as follows:
"It is said that the adoption of statutes in several of the states
making this kind of injury actionable shows that the courts have
no right to furnish the redress without statutory authority. It has
always been the pride of the common law that it permitted no
wrong with damage, without a remedy. In all cases where this
class of injuries have occurred, proceeding alone from the malice
of the defendant, it is held to be a wrong accompanied by damage.
That courts have failed to apply the remedy has ever been felt a
reproach to the administration of the law; and the fact that the
people have regarded this neglect of duty on the part of the courts
so gross as to make that duty imperative by statutory law fur-
nishes no evidence of the creation of a new right or the giving of
a new remedy but is a severe criticism upon the courts for an
omission of duty already existing, and now imposed by statute
upon them, which is only confirmatory of the common law."
Likewise, the courts of several states where "spite fence" statutes
10 J. O'Meara & H. W. Santen, "Legal Status of the Spite Fence in
Ohio," 2 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 164 (1928), quoting Burdick on Torts, states:
"There is, however, increasing recognition of the principle that intentional
damage is prima facie tortious and requires a justification .... Intentional
damage having been inflicted, the justification is benefit intended. Such
intended benefit will justify the intended harm. But where there is no
intended benefit, the harm will be actionable."
11 This idea is aptly expressed in the following language of the Supreme
Court of Alabama in Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912):
"The authority of precedents, however, must often yield to the force of rea-
son, and to the paramount demands of justice, as well as the decencies of
civilized society, and the law ought to speak with a voice responsive to these
demands. We have examined the decisions and the reasoning of the various
courts upon this question, and, unfettered by any precedents of our own, we
are led to the deliberation that the majority view, as above stated, is founded
upon a vicious fallacy, and is violative of sound legal principle as well as of
common justice. But little else remains to be said in support of the rule of
reason and good morals. The rule of malice was, we think, conceived in
error, and has indeed become a Caliban of the law,--the ugly and misshapen
offspring of a decent and honorable parentage,-and we are unwilling to
sanction in this jurisdiction its evil and odious sway."
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have been enacted indicate that a right of action existed in favor
of a plaintiff even without the statute.1
2
While the majority of the decisions invoking the modern rule
have been in suits in equity for injunctive relief, two of the lead-
ing opinions' were in case actions for damages, and no distinction
seems to have been made as to the applicability of the two rem-
edies in the spite. fence situation. The primary question in either
form of action is whether the particular obstruction is a spite
fence such as constitutes a nuisance. In this respect, it should also
be noted that the equity decisions cite the law decisions, and vice
versa, with no distinction as to the form of action. Of the states
following the modern rule, Michigan, 14 Nebraska, 15 and Ala-
bama' are the only ones in which cases on spite fences have been
presented more than once, and those cases all involved injunction
suits. In Oklahoma only has the problem been presented in ac-
tions both at law17 and in equity.' 8 The equity action was the
earlier one to be decided, and, while the evidence there did not
justify an injunction, inasmuch as the fence complained of was
not erected purely out of spite, there is no indication by the
court that the modern rule would not be adopted if the facts
established the existence of a spite fence; and in the law action
damages were awarded. Thus, there is nothing to indicate that
the courts in accepting the modern rule are relying on the theory
of an "equitable tort."
In Illinois, three cases have touched on the problem of spite
fences; none were equity actions, and the opinion of the court
in the third, in so far as spite fences are concerned, was dictum.
The Supreme Court in Guest v. Reynolds, 9 an action on the case,
held that, in the absence of an adverse right by prescription,
grant, or otherwise, the owner of real property has a right to erect
12 Bar Due v. Cox, 47 Cal. App. 713, 190 P. 1056 (1920); Rideout v.
Knox, 148 Mass. 368, 19 N. E. 390 (1889); Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N. H. 93,
54 A. 945 (1903).
18 Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439 (1909) ; Hibbard v.
Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, 158 P. 1158 (1916).
14 Peck v. Roe, 110 Mich. 52, 67 N. W. 1080 (1896); Kirkwood v.
Finegan, 95 Mich. 543, 55 N. W. 457 (1893); Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich.
52, 45 N. W. 381 (1890) ; Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N. W. 838
(1888).
15 Dunbar v. O'Brien, 117 Neb. 45, 220 N. W. 278 (1928); Bush v.
Mockett, 95 Neb. 552, 145 N. W. 1001 (1914).
16 Daniel v. Birmingham Dental Mfg. Co., 207 Ala. 659, 93 So. 652
(1922) ; Norton v. Randolph, 176 Ala. 381, 58 So. 283 (1912).
'7 Hibbard v. Halliday, 58 Okla. 244, 158 P. 1158 (1916).
18 Bixby v. Cravens, 57 Okla. 119, 156 P. 1184 (1916).
19 68 Ill. 478 (1873).
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on his own land a fence which will have the effect of depriving an
adjoining owner of light and air, and such a fence, unless it is
made of offensive material, will not be a nuisance for which an
action will lie. While the plaintiff alleged malice and insisted his
action was for a nuisance, arising out of a violation of a relative
right, the theory on which the modern rule is based, the court
refused to recognize it as such, but treated it as an action for dam-
ages for obstruction of light, air, and view. Honsel v. Conant,20
another case action, followed the Guest decision. In the third
case, City of Dixon v. Messer,21 decided after the Michigan rule
had been pronounced, the city sought to prosecute the defendant
for violating an ordinance forbidding partition fences more than
four feet high. The court, citing the Guest case, held the ordi-
nance invalid on the ground that ownership of property carries
with it the general right in the owner to use and enjoy his prop-
erty in such a manner as he sees fit. While the fence here was not
a spite fence, since it was erected to prevent trouble between the
adjoining families, the court by way of dictum said: "But if this
had been a 'spite fence' and the ordinance had been aimed at spite
fences, yet the very great weight of authority is that, in states
where there is no prescriptive right to an unobstructed view and
light and air over adjoining premises of another owner, even a
spite fence may be built by a landowner, or rather, his motive is
immaterial, and he may build such a structure as he pleases on his
own land." The cases supporting this rule were cited by the court,
as were also the Michigan decisions tending to establish a modern
doctrine. Inferentially, however, the Illinois court approves the
former.
Since there has been no "spite fence" decision in Illinois in
the past thirty years, the attitude which the court in this juris-
diction might take today is left to conjecture.
S. ZEBLAT
ALIENS-DISABILITIES-RIGHT OF ALIEN WIDOW OF CITIZEN TO
DowER.-In the case of Schoellkopf v. DeVry1 the Supreme Court
of Illinois was confronted with the question of whether or not an
alien widow of a citizen of the United States and this state is
entitled to dower in the real estate of which her husband died
seised; and the majority of the court held in favor of her applica-
tion. In arriving at this conclusion, the court, beginning with an
act in 1819, reviewed the course of legislation with regard to the
20 12 Ill. App. 259 (1882).
21 136 I1. App. 488 (1907).
1 366 11. 39, 7 N. E. (2d) 757 (1937).
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rights of aliens to hold property in this state and pointed out
that with one exception liberality toward aliens was the keynote;
that the purpose of the dower act was to give the right to all
surviving husbands and widows; that while section 1 of the dower
act of 1897,2 which is now in force, could not apply to alien
widows of citizens, it was passed at a time when an act of Con-
gress3 provided that an alien woman who married a citizen would
immediately become a citizen, and that section 2 of the dower
act provided that the widow of an alien (whether she be an alien
or a citizen) should have the right of dower as if the alien were a
citizen; that since the legislature was not trying to discriminate
against the alien widow of a citizen, the implication is that she
also should receive dower.
In a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Herrick, the strongest
point made is that section 1 and section 2 of the present dower
act were first enacted in 1845-before Congress provided that an
alien woman who married a citizen would become a citizen-and
that re-enactment of these sections worked merely a continuation
of them. However, admitting this, the writer is inclined to believe
that as the act stood in 1845 the same result should have been
reached then as was reached in this case. Other courts have given
the alien husband of a citizen an estate by courtesy 4 and the alien
widow of a citizen dower 5 when nothing more was present to
indicate a change in the common law than a statute providing sub-
stantially that an alien should have the right to take and hold land
acquired by deed, devise, or descent. A similar statute was in
effect in 18456 and is in force in Illinois today, although there are
certain qualifications set forth in the present act7 limiting the
time for which an alien can hold title before the state will have
the right to divest the alien thereof. The majority of the court
does not avail itself of this provision, not wishing to say that
dower is acquired by descent, although the dissenting opinion
2 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 41, 1.
8 10 Stat. at L. 604 (1855), R. S. § 1994; this continued in force until 1922,
when it was provided that if a woman marries a citizen she shall not become
a citizen by reason of such marriage. U. S. C. A., Tit. 8, Sec. 368.
4 Cooke v. Doron, 215 Pa. 393, 64 A. 595 (1906) ; Breuer v. Berry, 194
Iowa 243, 189 N. W. 717 (1922).
5 Sutliff v. Forgey, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 89 (1823). This case caused much
confusion in subsequent cases in New York, because of an erroneous note
in the report.
6 Rev. Stat. 1845, p. 47; resident alien could hold as if a natural born
citizen. [See Schoellkopf v. DeVry, 366 Ill. 39, 7 N. E. (2d) 757 (1937),
p. 42].
7 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 6, 1 2 contains the limitations as to
time for holding.
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erroneously indicates that the majority does so hold. But the Illi-
nois dower act provides a much more substantial footing in itself
by the provisions of the second section, and it is on this that the
majority very largely rests its opinion.
Further, the cases cited by the minority, as sustaining the state-
ment that some courts have held an alien widow of a citizen could
not take dower although had her husband been an alien she could
have, are not good authorities, as the statutes involved are dis-
similar to any we have ever had. In Mick v. Mick8 it was stated
that no provision had ever been made by statute in New York
for the alien widow of a natural born citizen, but this was clearly
erroneous and was shown so to be in the subsequent case of Priest
v. Cummings.9 Chief Justice Savage in Mick v. Mick relied on an
incorrect marginal note in Sutliff v. Forgey,10 as did Chancellor
Kent in his Commentaries.11 Connolly v. Smith12 and Currin v.
Finn's refer to Mick v. Mick for the same blanket statement,
although all of these cases are correctly decided in view of the
peculiar statutory provisions which control them as well as the
case of Priest v. Cummings.14 Without entering into an extended
discussion of the provisions on which these decisions hinged, it is
sufficient to say that all of these cases must be carefully read
and their relation to each other considered to reach the doctrine
really set forth.
The dower act is not a masterpiece, and the court was indeed
given a difficult problem; but proceeding with the usual prin-
ciples of statutory construction as a guide and ascertaining the
legislative intent by looking at similar legislation which preceded
the act in question, the thing to be remedied, and the object to
be attained, the court reached a logical conclusion.
G. W. McGuRN
APPEARANCE-GENERAL OR SPECIAL-WHETHER PROCEEDING TO
TRIAL CONSTITUTES GENERAL APPEARANCE SO AS TO WAIVE ERROR
IN OVERRLING MOTION ATTACKING JURISDICTION UNDER ILLINOIS
PRACTICE.-In the recent case of In re Rackliffe's Estate,' the
8 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 379 (1833).
9 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 617 (1837).
10 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 89 (1823).
" 4 Kent's Comm. 36-7. See also Priest v. Cummings, 16 Wend. (N. Y.)
622 (1837).
12 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 59 (1839).
'3 3 Den. 229 (N. Y.) (1846).
14 20 Wend. (N. Y.) 338 (1838).
1 In re Rackliffe's Estate, 366 Ill. 22, 7 N. E. (2nd) 754 (1937), revers-
ing on other grounds 284 Ill. App. 649, 3 N. E. (2nd) 164 (1936). The
pertinent facts are as follows: The defendant was subpoenaed as a witness in
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Supreme Court of Illinois held that a defendant has a right to file
a motion attacking the jurisdiction of the court, together with
such other motions as are desired to be made, and that by entering
on the trial, such defendant does not waive the error in the
refusal of the motion attacking the jurisdiction.
This decision apparently removes all doubt as to the meaning
of the sections of the Civil Practice Act that were here involved,
for, in this case, among other things, the plaintiff contended that
by entering upon the trial of the cause in the Circuit Court,
offering proof, and examining witnesses, the defendant thereby
entered her general appearance and cannot raise the question of
jurisdiction on this appeal. Such was undoubtedly the well set-
tled rule before January 1, 1934, the effective date of the Civil
Practice Act.2 However, as the court pointed out, this rule has
been changed by the Civil Practice Act 8 and Supreme Court
Rule 21, 4 and the defendant does not waive his plea to the
jurisdiction when it is overruled, by answering over.
H. N. LiNoiE
a hearing in the Probate Court to declare one Julia B. Rackliffe incompetent.
The suggestion was made, during the course of the hearing, that the
defendant had in her possession $18,000.00 in bonds belonging to Julia B.
Rackliffe. The defendant was not questioned on that matter and no citation
was ever issued to require her to turn over the bonds. Nevertheless, the
Probate Court entered an order requiring the defendant to turn over the
bonds to the conservator. The conservator then moved the court for a rule
to show cause why defendant should not be in contempt of court. Defendant
filed a special appearance contesting the jurisdiction of the Probate Court
to enter the order. This contention was overruled and the defendant appealed
to the CircuiCt ... ' -m--- e th order of the Probate Curt and
required the defendant to give testimony as to the ownership of the bonds.
2 Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 141, 17 N. E. 232 (1888) ; Jackson v.
Winans, 287 Ill. 382, 122 N. E. 611 (1919) ; Haley v. Reidelberger, 340 Il1.
154, 172 N. E. 19 (1930).
3 Section 48, Civil Practice Act; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935),
Ch. 110, § 172, as follows: "Defendant may, within the time for pleading,
file a motion to dismiss the action or suit, where any of the following defects
appear on the face of the complaint, and he may within the same time, file
a similar motion supported by affidavits where any of the said following
defects exist but do not appear upon the face of the complaint: (a) That the
court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. (b) That the court
has not jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action or suit, provided the
defect cannot be removed by a transfer of the case to a court having juris-
diction." This largely adopts rules 106-110 under the New York Rules of
Civil Practice. Section 43, Civil Practice Act; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats.
(1935), Ch. 110, § 167 (3), as follows: (3) "All defenses, whether to thejurisdiction or in abatement or in bar, may be pleaded together, but the
court may order defenses to the jurisdiction or in abatement to be tried first.
An answer containing only defenses to the jurisdiction or in abatement shall
not constitute an admission of the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint."
4 Supreme Court Rule 21; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110,
§ 259.21, as follows: "Where, after denial by court of a motion under section
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BANKS AND BANKING - STOCKHOLDERS - LIABILITY OF STOCK-
HOLDERS OF LIQUIDATING BANK TO ASSIGNEE BANK WHICH ASSUMED
LIABILITIES.-The Supreme Court of Illinois in Continental Illi-
nois National Bank & Trust Company v. Peoples Trust & Savings
Bank,1 decided that stockholders of a bank are not liable for the
debts incurred by the bank by a contract of liquidation not made
in compliance with section 152 of the Banks and Banking Act.
The Peoples Trust & Savings Bank having become financially
involved entered into a contract with the Continental Illinois
Bank & Trust Company by the terms of which the latter bank
was to loan an amount of money equal to the liabilities of the
Peoples Bank, taking as security all of the assets except leases.
The Continental was to retain the proceeds of the loan and pay
it out to the creditors as they sought payment of their demands.
After all of the assets were liquidated in compliance with this
agreement and applied against the loan, there remained an unpaid
balance of over five and one-half millions of dollars, for which
amount suit was brought against the stockholders of the Peoples
Bank to enforce their constitutional liability. The Supreme Court
reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, obtained in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, holding that the Continental was
not a creditor of the Peoples Bank within the meaning of Section
6 of Article XI,3 as the contract, having been made without the
approval of the Auditor of Public Accounts as required by
statute, 4 was void.
48 of the Civil Practice Act, the defendant pleads over, this shall not be
deemed a waiver of any error in the decision denying such motion, and the
defendant shall have the right to assign such error on appeal from the final
judgment. This rule shall extend to the case where the motion is one attack-
ing the jurisdiction of the court over the person made under a special appear-
ance, and the pleading over by the defendant has involved the entry on his
part of a general appearance."
1 366 Ill. 366, 9 N. E. (2d) 53 (1937).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 16%, § 15.
3 Ill. Const. (1870), "Every stockholder in a banking corporation or insti-
tution shall be individually responsible and liable to its creditors, over and
above the amount of stock by him or her held, to an amount equal to his or
her respective shares so held, for all its liabilities accruing while he or she
remains such stockholder."
4 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 16Y, § 15, "Any association
organized under this Act or any corporation with banking powers organized
in pursuance of any general or special law of this state, or any consolidated
corporation with banking powers as provided for by this Act, on depositing
with the Auditor an amount of money equal to the whole amount of debts
and demands against it, including the expenses of this proceeding, or upon
making a contract in writing, approved by the Auditor, by which another
bank or banking association incorporated under the laws of this State or of
the United States assumes the whole amount of debts and demands against
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The decision is based upon the theory that the contract was
ultra vires of both banks, for by the rule that charters of corpora-
tions affected with a public interest are to be strictly construed, 5
a power that is not one of the enumerated ones can not be
implied. The statute gave to the banks the power to enter into
such a liquidation agreement, but the present contract, not having
been made in compliance with its terms, was beyond the corporate
powers of both banks.
In the absence of statute, and in Illinois before the present
statute was in effect, 6 contracts of this nature have usually been
held to be valid,7 some states limiting the assumption of liabilities
to the amount of assets received. 8 Whether such a contract will
give the transferee bank a right to hold the stockholders of the
transferor for the loss it sustains in carrying out the contract
depends upon the nature of the transaction. If the transaction is
an outright sale of the assets there exists no debt of the bank and
hence no liability of its stockholders.9 If, however, the transaction
is something short of a sale such as a liquidating agreement,'0 a
loan with the assets pledged as security," or a transfer of assets
plus a note of the transferor,12 the courts have uniformly held
that a debt was created which could be enforced against the
stockholders. This liability may not be avoided by the stock-
holders by showing that they did not consent to or voted against
the agreement.' 3
it, an executed copy of which contract shall be deposited with the Auditor,
may determine its affairs, distribute its assets among its stockholders, resign
its charter or certificate of incorporation, and close up its business. .. ."
5 Knass v. Madison Kedzie State Bank, 354 Ill. 554, 188 N. E. 836 (1934).
6 Sherrard State Bank v. Vernon, 243 Ill. App. 122 (1926) ; People ex rel.
Nelson v. Sherrard State Bk., 258 Ill. App. 169 (1930).
7 Hightower v. American National Bank, 263 U. S. 351, 68 L. Ed. 334
(1923) ; Nakdimen v. First National Bank, 177 Ark. 303, 6 S. W. (2d) 505
(1928); Andrew v. People's Savings Bank, 216 Iowa 252, 249 N. W. 352,
89 A. L. R. 783 (1933) ; Carl Zollmann, Banks and Banking (1936), I, 288,
sec. 347.
8 Mitchell v. Beckman, 64 Cal. 117, 28 P. 110 (1883) ; First National Bank
v. Slaton Independent School Dist., 58 S. W. (2d) 870 (Tex. App., 1933).
9 American National Bank v. Holsen, 331 Ill. 622, 163 N. E. 448 (1928);
Assets Realization Co. v. Howard, 211 N. Y. 430, 105 N. E. 680 (1914).
10 Hightower v. American National Bank, 263 U. S. 351, 68 L. Ed. 334
(1923) ; Poch v. Taylor, 186 Ark. 618, 54 S. W. (2d) 994 (1937) ; Andrew
v. Farmers' State Bank, 215 Iowa 627, 246 N. W. 618 (1933); American
State Bank v. Aaron, 271 Mich. 147, 260 N. W. 14, 100 A. L. R. 1266 (1935).
11 Anderson v. Stone, 190 Ark. 122, 77 S. W. (2d) 638 (1935) ; Andrew
v. Peoples Savings Bank, 216 Iowa 252, 249 N. W. 352, 89 A. L. R. 783
(1933); Lawhead v. Lazzelle, 113 W. Va. 896, 170 S. E. 172 (1933).
12 Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U. S. 230, 26 S. Ct. 495, 50 L. Ed. 738 (1906);
Andrew v. Peoples Savings Bank, 216 Iowa 252, 249 N. W. 352 (1933).
13 Popleton v. Wallace, 201 U. S. 245, 26 S. Ct. 698, 50 L. Ed. 743 (1906);
Andrew v. Farmers State Bank, 215 Iowa 627, 246 N. W. 618 (1933).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
The contract in the instant case, which was ratified by the
stockholders, expressly provided that the obligation of the Peoples
Bank to repay the loan constituted an existing debt, and that
the liability of the stockholders under the constitution should
remain in full force and effect until the loan was repaid, which, if
it were not void, would bring this case within those holding the
stockholders liable, as the transaction was not a sale. It would
seem that the statutory provision requiring prior approval of this
type of contract was designed to protect the stockholders and
depositors of the bank assuming the debts, rather than to permit
the stockholders of a failing bank to escape an otherwise almost
certain liability. If this be so, then the Continental should be
subrogated to the rights of the creditors whose claims it has paid
in full under the void agreement. The case was not tried on this
theory nor does it appear that recovery was urged on this ground.
In American National Bank of Mt. Carmel v. Holsen,14 which
arose before the present statute was enacted, recovery on the
theory of subrogation was denied, because the transaction between
the banks was held to be an outright sale of the assets. However,
in a recent case in West Virginia, recovery on the theory of
subrogation was permitted, but it was held that the agreement
was not a sale but a liquidation agreement. 15
F. G. ANGER
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - POLICE POWER - REGULATION OF Ac-
COUNTING AS A PROFESSION IN RELATION TO C. P. A. AND P. A.
REQUISITEs.-The constitutionality of the Illinois statutes regulat-
ing the profession of public accountants was reviewed for the
second time by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of
Elliott v. University of Illinois.1
The first act in relation to this profession was passed in 1903
and amended in 1907.2 This statute was entitled "An act to
regulate the profession of public accountants." It provided that
the Trustees of the University of Illinois should receive applica-
tions, ascertain qualifications, give examinations, and grant cer-
tificates to persons entitling them to practice as Certified Public
Accountants. Those individuals who had been employed as public
accountants or had practiced on their own for a period of five
years prior to the act were exempted from the above requirements.
14 331 Ill. 622, 163 N. E. 448 (1928) ; See also Guthrie v. State Trust &
Savings Bank, 257 Ill. App. 242 (1930).
15 McClaren v. Anderson, 110 W. Va. 380, 158 S. E. 379 (1931).
1 365 Ill. 338, 6 N. E. (2d) 647 (1937).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110Y2, §§ 1-6.
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The statute further provided that "nothing herein contained shall
operate to prevent one who is the lawful holder of a C. P. A.
certificate issued in compliance with the laws of another state
from practicing as such within this State and styling himself a
C. P. A. "3 Any use of the title C. P. A. unauthorized by the Act
was declared to be unlawful.
In 1925, another statute was passed which provided for the
regulation of the use both of the title of P. A. (Public Ac-
countant) and C. P. A. (Certified Public Acountant) .4 It was
stated to be unlawful to practice under either of these titles
without a certificate of registration issued by the Department of
Registration and Education. "Public Accountancy" was defined
as "accounting or auditing services as distinguished from book-
keeping, on a fee basis, per diem, or otherwise, for more than one
employer." Although a distinction is maintained throughout the
act between the titles P. A. and C. P. A., provision is made only
for the licensing of Public Accountants. No provision was made
for the licensing of any citizen of Illinois as a C. P. A. who was
not one at the time the act went into effect, but the statute did
allow previously licensed C. P. A.'s and those licensed in other
states to be licensed as such in Illinois. In addition, the act
allowed those persons practicing as public accountants prior to
July 1, 1925, to register as such, but required those employed as
such, but not practicing on their own, to have five years experi-
ence in order to be exempt. Penalties were laid on Public
Accountants, but not on Certified Public Accountants, for prac-
+hnii n l ,1 . o lcnse ithin te-n daysc ftp., rlntp vwhpn
the license fee was due.
The first case involving the constitutionality of this legislation
to reach the Supreme Court of Illinois was that of Frazer v.
Shelton,5 which concerned the 1925 statute. The court declared
that statute to be unconstitutional 6 for four reasons: First, the
failure to provide for the future granting of the title C. P. A. and
the licensing as Certified Public Accountants of those previously
holding the title C. P. A. amounted to the granting of a special
"privilege, immunity, or franchise" in violation of the state con-
8 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110Y2, § 6.
4 L. 1925, p. 505.
5 320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696, 43 A. L. R. 1086 (1926).
6 After the 1925 statute was declared unconstitutional, the legislature
adopted an act "regulating the practice of public accounting by registration."
L. 1927, p. 689, amended 1935, L. 1935, p. 1075; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats.
(1935), Ch. 110%, §§ 7-24. § 7 reads, "That for the purposes of this act a
public accountant is one who serves or offers to serve the public generally in
(1) Performing audits or preparing financial statements for municipal cor-
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stitution ;7 second, the granting of the right to register as a P. A.
to those practicing public accountancy on their own prior to
July 1, 1925, and the requiring of five years experience of those
employed as public accountants, but not practicing on their own,
constituted an unreasonable and unconstitutional discrimination
in favor of the former and against the latter group ;s third, the
providing of penalties for the failure of P. A.'s to pay their
license fee within ten days after the date due without laying
similar penalties upon C. P. A.'s for a like failure amounted to
a discrimination which was arbitrary and unreasonable ;9 fourth,
the state police power does not extend to the regulation of the
practice of public accountancy as defined in the 1925 act.'" The
Supreme Court specifically pointed out in Frazer v. Shelton that
they were not deciding that the regulation of the use of the title
C. P. A. was not constitutional nor within the police power."
The principal case of Elliott v. Trustees of the University of
Illinois concerned the validity of the statute of 1903 as amended
in 1907. A bare majority of the Supreme Court (four justices
out of seven) held the act to be constitutional on three main
grounds: first, the title, "to regulate the profession of public
accountants," is germane to the contents of the body of the act,
and although it may be broader than the contents themselves,
that fact will not necessarily render the act unconstitutional ;12
porations, public utilities, banks, building and loan associations, trust estates(except when employed by the cestui que trust), insurance companies and
charitable organizations which receive and dispense funds donated by the
public. (2) Preparing or vouching for the accuracy of financial statements
of any business, knowing that such statements are to be used, (a) For the
information of stockholders or inactive or silent partners in such business,
(b) As an inducement to any person to invest in or extend credit to such
business, or (c) For filing in the office of the Secretary of State under the
provisions of 'The Illinois Securities Law.'" No case has yet arisen in regard
to this statute which has reached either the Illinois Appellate or Supreme
Court.
7 Ill. Const. (1870), Art. IV, § 22.
8 People v. Logan, 284 Ill. 83, 119 N. E. 913 (1918) ; People v. Evans, 247
Ill. 547, 93 N. E. 388 (1910) ; Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84, 11 N. E. 881
(1887).
9 Josma v. Western Steel Car Co., 249 Ill. 508, 94 N. E. 945 (1911) ; Off
& Co. v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N. E. 264 (1908) ; Braceville Coal Co. v.
People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62 (1893) ; Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31
N. E. 395 (1892) ; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 7 N. E. 631 (1886).
10 In the case of State of Oklahoma v. Riedell, 109 Okla. 35, 233 P. 684,
42 A. L. R. 765 (1924), a statute requiring all public accountants to obtain
certificates was declared unconstitutional. Also see Bell v. Tackett, 134 Okla.
164, 272 P. 461 (1928).
11 320 Ill. 253, at p. 269.
12 People v. Roth, 249 Ill. 532, 94 N. E. 953 (1911); People v. Sayer,
246 Ill. 382, 92 N. E. 900 (1910).
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second, since the use of the title C. P. A. suggests that the person
using it has been examined and certified as an accountant, the
state may in the reasonable exercise of the police power regulate
the use of such title ;13 third, the exemptions granted under the
statute are valid in that they are reasonable and apply equally
to all similarly situated.14
One of the facts which make this case of particular interest is
that a vigorous dissent was filed by three of the justices, Chief
Justice Herrick, Justice Farthing, who, after having written the
majority opinion, changed his mind and joined in the dissent, and
Justice Jones, who wrote the minority opinion. The chief reasons
for the dissent were: first, that the body of the act is not germane
to the title in that the act creates a trade name (Certified Public
Accountant) and seeks to give a monopoly to those who possess
such certificates, and does not regulate the profession of public
accountants as it purports to do ;15 second, the statute constitutes
an unreasonable exercise of the police power in that it does not
protect or relate to public health, comfort, safety, morals, or gen-
eral welfare, but seeks to regulate an occupation which is private
except where carried on in businesses affected with a public inter-
est ;16 third, the statute discriminates unjustly against public ac-
countants in Illinois because it permits those licensed in compli-
ance with the laws of other states to practice in Illinois as
Certified Public Accountants without filling the requirements
demanded of Illinois practitioners. 17
In studying the decision one can note with profit that the
decisions of other states are uniform in upholding the validity of
13 McCullough v. Scott, 182 N. C. 865, 109 S. E. 789 (1921) ; People v.
Marlowe, 203 N. Y. S. 474 (1923) ; Henry v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. Rep. 67,
260 S. W. 190 (1924) ; Crow v. State, 97 Tex. Crim. Rep. 98, 260 S. W. 573(1924) ; Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 208 Ala. 185, 94 So.
94 (1922), aff'd 263 U. S. 394, 44 S. Ct. 128, 68 L. Ed. 354 (1923) ; State v.
De Verges, 153 La. 349, 95 So. 805 (1923).
14 Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696, 43 A. L. R. 1086 (1926);
People v. Logan, 284 Ill. 83, 119 N. E. 913 (1918) ; People v. Evans, 247 Ill.
547, 93 N. E. 388 (1910); Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84, 11 N. E. 881(1887).
15 People v. Roth, 249 Ill. 532, 94 N. E. 953 (1911); People v. Stokes,
281 Ill. 159, 118 N. E. 87 (1917); People v. Ankrum, 286 Ill. 319, 121 N. E.
579 (1919).
16 Frazer v. Shelton, 320 Ill. 253, 150 N. E. 696, 43 A. L. R. 1086 (1926)
Toledo, Wabash & Western Railway Co. v. City of Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37(1873) ; State of Oklahoma v. Riedell, 109 Okla. 35, 233 P. 684, 42 A. L. R.
765 (1924).
17 Gore v. National Association of Public Accountants, 231 Ill. App. 38(1923). In this case it was held that one of the state examiners could not
restrain the giving of examinations in Illinois by a corporation organized
under the laws of the District of Columbia and engaged in examining and
certifying persons as Certified Public Accountants.
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statutes which regulate the use of the title C. P. A.1 8 But it is
plain that public accountants in Illinois are at a disadvantage in
that persons may take examinations (even within the state of
Illinois) and receive the title C. P. A. from corporations or per-
sons authorized to grant said title by the laws of other states, and
then may proceed to practice in Illinois in competition with local
accountants.19 And the use of a title so received is not prohibited
but expressly allowed by the Illinois statute.20 The solution to this
dilemma would seem to lie in the setting of certain requirements
or qualifications for those licensed under the laws of other states
and in forbidding the giving of examinations in Illinois for the
purpose of granting the title C. P. A. by others than those
authorized to do so under Illinois law. Illinois may well look to
the example of New York in this respect.2 1
H. WILL
COUNTI -TAXATION-LIMITATIONS ON POWER OF CLERK TO
INCREASE LEVw.-In People ex rel. Ghent, County Collector v.
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company'
the Illinois Supreme Court has set out some of the limitations on
the power of the county clerk to add to the sum levied by the
taxing body.
The court stated, "The county clerk in extending taxes may
add a reasonable amount for loss and cost where it has not been
added by the taxing body," 2 and "courts will not interfere with
the exercise of sound business judgment on the part of public
authorities but will intervene to prevent an abuse of discretion. "8
In the instant case the clerk testified that in extending the
taxes and determining the rate for the various political sub-
18 People v. Marlowe, 203 N. Y. S. 474 (1923) ; Henry v. State, 97 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 67, 260 S. W. 190 (1924) ; Lehmann v. State Board of Public
Accountancy, 208 Ala. 185, 94 So. 94 (1922) ; State v. De Verges, 153 La.
349, 95 So. 805 (1923). The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
the Alabama case but did not pass on the question of constitutionality in 263
U. S. 394, 44 S. Ct. 128, 68 L. Ed. 354 (1923).
'9 Gore v. National Association of Public Accountants, 231 Ill. App. 38
(1923).
20 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 1102, § 6.
21 People v. Marlowe, 203 N. Y. S. 474 (1923) ; People v. National Asso-
ciation of Certified Public Accountants, 197 N. Y. S. 775 (1923).
1 365 Ill. 443, 6 N. E. (2d) 851 (1937).
2 People v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 361 Ill. 590, 198 N. E. 694 (1935) ; People
v. Westminster Building Corp., 361 Ill. 153, 197 N. E. 623 (1935); People v.
Chicago & Alton Ry. Co., 289 Ill. 282, 124 N. E. 658 (1919); People v.
Sandberg Co., 282 Ill. 245, 118 N. E. 469 (1918).
3 People v. North Western Mutual Life Ins. Co., 361 Ill. 248, 197 N. E.
758 (1935); People v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 322 Ill. 150, 152
N. E. 575 (1926).
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divisions he took cognizance of the amount of revenues realized
from taxes in previous years, the amount of loss sustained in
previous years, and of the cost of extending and collecting these
various taxes. He had treated as losses all delinquent personal
property taxes not collected, all real estate forfeited to the state,
objections sustained, objections pending, objections in litigation
and discounts allowed. It was to these items of loss that the
defendant objected, and the court upheld its contention. As to
uncollected personal property taxes, the court, citing People v.
North Western Mutual Life Insurance Company,4 said they may
be included as losses only where it is shown that a bona fide
attempt has been made to collect them (which was not done in
this case), so that it is possible to determine what proportion are
uncollectible. The other items are obviously not tax losses and
it has in prior cases been so held.5
L. WHIDDEN
COURTS-JURISDICTION-1WHETHER PROCEEDING FOR JUDGMENT
BY CONFESSION IS "CONTRACT ACTION" WITHIN JURISDICTION OF
MUNICIPAL COURT.-It has been held in Schillinger v. O'Connell,'
that the municipal court of Chicago had jurisdiction to enter a
judgment by confession for more than one thousand dollars, be-
cause such judgment was based on an "action" within the
meaning of the Municipal Court Act.2
The question arose in a complaint in chancery, filed in the
Superior Court of Cook County, to set aside and vacate a judg-
ment by confession entered against the plaintiff in the municipal
court for $2,104.11. It was the plaintiff's contention that the
municipal court had no jurisdiction to enter such judgment
because more than one thousand dollars was involved, and because
a judgment by confession on a warrant of attorney was not an
"action" on an express or implied contract within the meaning
of the act, requiring the jurisdiction of that court to be based
on an "action.'"' The Appellate Court of Illinois held that such
4 People v. North Western Mutual Life Ins. Co., 361 Ill. 248, 197 N. E.
758 (1935).
5 People v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 322 Ill. 150, 152 N. E. 575
(1926) ; People v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. R. Co., 354
Ill. 438, 188 N. E. 404 (1933) ; People v. Sandberg Co., 282 Ill. 245, 118
N. E. 469 (1918).
1 289 Ill. App. 271, 7 N. E. (2d) 153 (1937).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats., Ch. 37, § 390, provides that the municipal
court shall have jurisdiction of cases designated as of the first class "which
shall include (a) all actions on contracts express or implied .... when the
amount claimed by the plaintiff exclusive of costs exceeds one thousand
dollars ($1,000) ."
3 Ibid.
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a proceeding was an action on an express contract and that,
therefore, the judgment was not void so as to be subject to col-
lateral attack on the ground that it was entered without
jurisdiction.
Necessarily the holding of the court was based upon a con-
struction of the act in question, and the controversy was merely
one of whether the proceeding was an action within the applica-
tion of the statute.4 There are many broad and comprehensive
definitions of the term "action." 5 It has been designated as any
legal proceeding in a court for the enforcement of a right.6 In
Trustees of Schools v. Farnsworth,7 in speaking of the word
"action," it was stated: "In legal practice this word means
the formal demand of one's rights from another person or party
made and insisted on in a court of justice." In that same case
it was also pointed out that the term "action" had been em-
ployed as synonymous with "proceeding at law."
Yet despite this continued practice, this is the first case in
which want of jurisdiction has been urged on this ground in
an appellate court. The court points out that one reason for
holding a confession of judgment to fall within the definition
of the term "action" is that it has been so construed for more
than twenty-five years in the municipal court by the consistent
entering of judgments by confession for more than one thousand
dollars.
E. J. MEDLIN
DAMAGES-DIRECT OR REMOTE CONSEQUENCEs-LIABILITY FOR
NERVOUS SHOCK WITHOUT PHYSICAL IMPACT. - In Purdy v.
Woznesensky,' the Court of Appeals of the province of Sas-
katchewan, Canada, sustained a recovery of five hundred dollars
damages for injuries following nervous shock without physical
impact as the proximate result of a battery committed upon a
third person. The facts show that Mr. Purdy was dancing the
quadrille at a local country schoolhouse when the defendant,
without provocation, deliberately struck him on the head. Mrs.
Purdy, the plaintiff, saw her husband fall, screamed hysterically,
and fainted. As a result, her nervous system was permanently
impaired, and she was still under the care of a physician at the
time of this action. Although this inquiry is primarily directed
toward the recovery of damages, it is necessary to note that the
4 Ibid.
5 1 C. J. 926, 928.
6 Brand v. Brand, 252 Ill. 134, 96 N. E. 918 (1911).
7 278 Ill. App. 474 (1934).
1 [1937] 2 W. W. R. 116.
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court ruled that a good cause of action did exist. It asserted that
the wrongful act created an apparent and imminent danger to
the plaintiff's right of personal security which was foreseeable,
for "the defendant must be presumed as a reasonable man to
know of the vital concern which a wife instinctively feels for the
safety of her husband." '2
However, the defendant's contention was that even if a cause
of action did exist, the damages are too remote in the absence
of physical impact. He relied upon Victorian Railways Commis-
sioners v. Coultas,3 where the defendant's gateman negligently
allowed a Mr. and Mrs. Coultas to enter upon a crossing with a
horse and buggy as a train was approaching. Although they
managed to escape, Mrs. Coultas became ill as a result of fright.
The court refused a recovery on the ground that sudden terror
without any physical injury at the same instant was not the
natural and probable consequence of the gateman's negligent act.
This holding obtained a "strong footing" in the United States
as the basis of the "physical impact" theory of liability in torts
and developed into a hard and fast rule-if the defendant is
negligent and if at the same time there is physical impact of
some sort, then damages for nervous shock are proximate; if the
defendant were negligent and if there were no physical impact,
then the damages were remote and there could be no recovery.
In Ireland, the Coultas case was repudiated in 1890 by the
celebrated case of Bell v. Great Northern Railway4 which held
that the distinction was one of time only and not of proximity.
In other words, the rationale of the impact theory is to start
from the time of the effect and work backward instead of con-
sidering the cause and effect in the natural chain of events.
The court stated: "As well might it be said that a death caused
by poison is not to be attributed to the person who administered
it because the mortal effect is not produced contemporaneously
with its administration.' '5 England questioned the doctrine and
attempted to avoid it by subtle differentiation.6 Then it repudi-
ated the impact theory where the defendant's conduct was wilful
or wanton.7 However, wilful or wanton conduct is more the basis
for punitive damages as punishment rather than the basis for
2 Ibid., at p. 119.
3 L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222, 57 L. J. P. C. 69 (1888).
4 26 L. R. Ir. 428 (1890).
5 Ibid., at p. 438.
6 Pugh v. London Ry. Co., [1896] 2 Q. B. 248.
7 Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57, 66 L. J. Q. B. 493; Janvier v.
Sweeney, [1919] 2 K. B. 316, 88 L. J. K. B. 1231.
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compensatory damages. Finally, in Dulieu v. White and Sons,8
England definitely rejected the Coultas decision. Scotland fol-
lowed suit in Gilligan v. Robb.9 The court in the instant case said
that previously 10 it had been prone to abandon the precedent of
the Coultas case and could now do so, because the Privy Council
had stated: "But in England, in Scotland, and in Ireland alike,
the authority of Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas has
been questioned, and, to speak frankly, has been denied. I am
humbly of the opinion that the case can no longer be treated as
a decision of guiding authority."" Hence, it is definitely settled 2
in these jurisdictions that proof of actual impact is not necessary
to recover damages and that the relation of cause and effect may
be direct or proximate without it.
In the United States, the majority of the courts started with the
Coultas case as authority, and since then various doctrines have
been developed. 13 In Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Company, 4
the plaintiff, waiting to board a horsecar, was frightened by
another horsecar belonging to the defendant. Assuming the
defendant to have been negligent, the court denied recovery of
damages for a subsequent miscarriage and illness on the ground
that there can be no recovery for mere fright. It did not appreci-
ate the difference between mental anguish and physical injury
resulting from a nervous shock, which is physiological. It is
injudicious to assume as a matter of law that a nervous shock
merely affects the mental functions when medical science has
proven, especially since the World War, that a shock withQut
impact can destroy human tissues.1 5 It must be admitted that the
nervous system is as much a part of the human body as the bones
and that the mind and the body act reciprocally upon each
other. 16 The doctrine that there can be no recovery for fright
has been perverted where the facts show a tortious act and a
8 [1901] 2 K. B. 669, 70 L. J. K. B. 837.
9 [1910] S. C. 856.
10 Bielitski v. Obadisk, [1921] 3 W. W. R. 229, 15 Sask. L. R. 153; Hogan
v. Regina, [19241 2 W. W. R. 307, 18 Sask. L. R. 423.
11 Coyle v. Watson, [1915] A. C. 1, 13, 14, 83 L. J. P. C. 307.
12 See also Ontario, Negro v. Pietra's Bread Co., Ltd., [1933] 0. R. 112.
18 The weight of authority in the United States denies recovery of sub-
stantial damages, 26 R. C. L. 762; 17 C. J. 831, 838. For citations pro and
con, see Cooley on Torts (4th ed., 1932), I, 103-104, sec. 48; A. H.
Throckmorton, "Damages for Fright," 34 Harv. L. Rev. 260 (1921).
14 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 781 (1896).
15 H. F. Goodrich, "Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage," 20 Mich.
L. Rev. 497 (1922); Bell v. Great Northern Ry., [1890] 26 L. R. Ir. 428.
36 Purcell v. St. Paul R. R. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892);
Sloaner v. Southern California Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896).
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resultant bodily injury. The court also asserted that if such
claims were allowed, a flood of litigation of feigned claims for
speculative damages would result, and a strong public policy
forbids this. It is argued that injury resulting from a state of
mind is too elusive and indefinite to be calculated according to
the objective test of liability. The effect of such a conclusion is
to deny a remedy for an actual wrong and to brand a reality as
a mental fancy. There can be no objection to increased litigation
if legal rights are actually infringed. Also, the measure of dam-
age is no more difficult to prove under the modern doctrine than
it is in the cases of real estate valuation or in the cases of physical
impact where the jury is allowed to consider mental pain and
suffering, inconvenience, and the like.1 7 Expert medical testimony
is available and it is for the jury to make the final determination.
In conclusion, the "impact theory" is giving way to common
sense where the injuries from a nervous shock can be traced from
the tortious act with some degree of assurance in the natural
course of events. Once the wrongful act is established, the defend-
ant should be held liable for all damages that flow proximately
therefrom, and it is not necessary that he foresee the particular
consequences. The maxim "wherever there is an injury, there is
a remedy," has been referred to with pride by jurists as denoting
the flexibility of the common law to meet new situations. The
marked advancement of medical science, therefore, demands that
the courts carefully reconsider the old doctrine, as newly realized
factors naturally change the premises from which deductions are
to be made. The Restatement of the Law of Torts 8 favors the
growing doctrine, but so far Illinois' 9 has upheld the principles
of the Coultas case.
R. F. OLSON
EVIDENcE-JuDcIAL NOTICE-LANDSTEINER BLOOD TEST, USED
TO NEGATIVE POSsMILITY OF PATERNITY, AS ESTABLISHING ScI-
ENTIFIC FACT.-In Arais v. Kalensnikoff' the District Court of
California, on an appeal from a decision establishing the de-
fendant as the father of the plaintiff's child, held that, where
such a decision is contrary to physical possibility as shown by
17 Cooley on Torts, (4th ed., 1932), I, 107, sec. 48; Chicago City Ry. Co.
v. Anderson, 182 Ill. 298, 55 N. E. 366 (1899) ; Chicago Consolidated Trac-
tion Co. v. Schrilter, 222 Ill. 364, 78 N. E. 820 (1906).
18 Vol. 11 (1934) 1177, sec. 436. See also p. 840, sec. 310.
19 Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11, 24 Am. Rep. 607 (1877); Braun v.
Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657, 42 L. R. A. 199 (1898). But see Brown-
back v. Frailey, 78 11. App. 262 (1898).
1 67 P. (2d) 1059 (Cal., 1937).
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the Landsteiner blood grouping test, the court will take judicial
notice of such test and the result derived from it as establishing
a scientific fact and will reverse the finding of the trial court
which is based solely on testimony of a witness which is contrary
to scientific fact.
In the instant case, the plaintiff testified that the defendant was
the father of her child and that she had had sexual relations with
no man other than the defendant since her separation from her
second husband. The defendant, a man seventy years of age,
testified that he had never had sexual relations with the plaintiff
and both he and his wife testified that he had been impotent for
many years.
The trial court, with the consent of the plaintiff, appointed a
physician to make a blood grouping test on the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the child. The testimony of the doctor making
the test was that from the results it was shown that the defendant
could not be the father of the child; that the child fell into blood
group B while both the plaintiff and the defendant were of blood
group 0. The conclusion from these established facts is that one
of the parents had to be in a group containing the gene desig-
nated as B in order for issue of that union to fall into blood
group B. Despite this scientific conclusion, the trial court held
for the plaintiff.
In giving their opinion reversing the trial court, the District
Court stated: ". . . a finding of fact based solely upon the testi-
mony of a witness, contrary to a scientific fact, will be set aside
by this court on appeal as not supported by substantial evidence."
Thus, they recognized the results of the Landsteiner test as a
scientific fact of which the court will take judicial notice.
The only court of last resort in this country that has passed on
the admissibility of such tests is the Supreme Court of South
Dakota. In the case of State v. Damm, 2 they held that it was not
such an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse to direct
that the plaintiff mother and her child submit to the blood test
as to constitute prejudicial error requiring reversal. This holding
was based specifically upon the proposition that it did not "suffi-
ciently appear from the record in this case that modern medical
science is agreed upon the transmissibility of blood characteristics
to such an extent that it can be accepted as an unquestioned sci-
entific fact that if the blood groupings of parents are known, the
blood group of the offspring can be determined, or that, if the
blood groupings of the mother and child are known it can be
accepted as a positively established scientific fact that the blood
group of the father could not have been a certain specific char-
2 62 S. D. 123, 252 N. W. 7 (1933).
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acteristic group." 8 From this it might be inferred that it was
more a lack of sufficient evidence as to the reliability of blood
tests than a refusal to accept them in evidence.
Scientific opinion is now in accord regarding the fact that the
blood of the child can contain only such elements as were present
in the blood of the parents and no elements not contained in the
blood of the parents. It may be seen from this that the only value
such tests may have at present is in determining that the accused
is not the parent of the child.4 Where the blood of the child falls
into a grouping such as might be a result of a mating of the
alleged parents, the test is valueless since all human blood is
roughly grouped into four main classes which do not sufficiently
limit the number of possible parents.5
Two states, New York 6 and Wisconsin,7 now have statutes
empowering the trial court, in an action to establish paternity, to
direct that the plaintiff, her child, and the defendant submit to
one or more blood tests, the result of which is to be receivable
in evidence where definite exclusion is established. At the present
there have been no cases involving this question before the appel-
late courts of Illinois, hence we do not have, as yet, any judicial
determination of the admissibility in this state.
R. L. TINDALL
FRAUD--RELLNCE AND INDUCEMENT-WHETHER RELATION BE-
TWEEN BANK AND CUSTOMER GIVES RIGHT To RELY ON REPRE-
SENTATION AS TO FUTURE CONDUCT - The case of Stewart v.
Phoenix National Bank,1 decided by the Supreme Court of
Arizona, presents an interesting problem concerning fiduciary
relations. In an action for fraud and deceit, the plaintiff alleged
that for twenty-three years he had been a customer of the
defendant bank and that during this time the bank had been his
financial adviser, by reason of which a confidential relationship
existed between the parties; that the plaintiff was induced by an
agent of the defendant to give a note and mortgage as security for
a previously incurred and unsecured indebtedness by representa-
tions that they were wanted only to make the records of the bank
satisfactory to the banking authorities and that the mortgage
3 Ibid., p. 12.
4 A. S. Weiner, 186 Am. Jour. Med. Science 257 (1933).
5 W. L. Flacks, "The Forensic Value of Blood Tests in Evidence: A
Review," 23 A. B. A. Jour. 472 (1937).
6 N. Y. Laws of 1935, Chs. 196, 197, 198; N. Y. Laws of 1936, Chs. 430,
439.
7 Wisconsin Laws of 1935, Ch. 351.
1 64 P. (2d) 101 (Ariz., 1937).
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would not be foreclosed, and that these representations were
false.2 The defendant demurred, and the lower court ruled in its
favor as to this part of the complaint and also as to other matters
set forth. The plaintiff appealed from this ruling.
The Supreme Court stated that all the elements of a cause of
action were shown clearly except that of a right to rely upon a
representation as to future conduct, but held that such reliance
was justified in this case, as the relationship between a bank and
a customer whom it advises on financial matters must now be
placed in the category of other relations legally presumed to be
fiduciary.
The opinion contains no citations to support this holding. After
making clear that it still regards the relation of a bank and
depositor as only that of a debtor and creditor, the court dis-
cusses the changes in the banking system which have resulted in
the present complicated credit structure under which one must
almost necessarily go to a bank to secure loans to carry on any
sizeable enterprise, saying that it cannot ignore the fact that
before a loan is given an investor will usually consult a bank
believing that he can rely on what the officers tell him, and that
banks hold themselves out as paragons of integrity and seek such
positions of confidence as trustee, executor, or administrator. It
ends this portion of its opinion by stating that the decision will
not preclude the bank's making a legitimate profit from clients,
but means that it is under a duty to make a full disclosure to the
customer. The court squarely holds that at the time of the action
of foreclosure brought by the defendant, the plaintiff in the
principal case had a cause of action, but judgment for the
defendant was affirmed on other grounds.8
In considering this case, the distinction between the two types
2 Brandenburg v. First Nat. Bk. of Casselton, 48 N. D. 176, 183 N. W. 643
(1921) ; when a president of a national bank, pretending to act as such,
made false representations to a customer, the bank was held liable, although
the acts were ultra vires; when fraud and deceit have been practiced, ultra
vires is not available. See also the many cases cited therein.
3 After alleging that defendant foreclosed, the plaintiff stated that agents
constantly assured him the bank would reconvey when plaintiff could pay
off the amount which was due on the note at the time of foreclosure but that
when arrangements for payment were made, the defendant refused to fulfill
its representations.
The Supreme Court upheld the demurrer of defendant as to this part of
the complaint and gave judgment for it. It also held that the lower court
properly took judicial notice of the record of the foreclosure action (a pro-
cedure unusual for a state court), in which the defense of fraud was not
raised, that the judgment was res judicata on this point, and that the assur-
ances as to reconveyance were not shown by the complaint to have prevented
plaintiff from making use of his possible defense.
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of confidential relations must be kept clearly in mind; they are:
first, the cases in which, from the very relationship of the parties,
a fiduciary relation is presumed, such as in the case of attorney
and client,4 physician and patient,5 trustee and beneficiary,6 priest
and parishioner, 7 guardian and ward,8 and the like; and second,
those cases where there is a finding of fact that in the particular
situation involved there was a confidential relationY As the court
stated in Higgins v. Chicago Title and Trust Company,'0 a con-
fidential relation is not limited to certain recognized legal
relations, "but it exists in all cases in which influence has been
acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and
betrayed. The origin of the confidence is immaterial. It may be
moral, social, domestic, or merely personal."
The first group is based upon artificial relations created by law
or the course of business." Generally, so long as the relationships
included in this category exist, confidence is reposed on one side,
while the power to exert influence is possessed on the other,'12
hence these are presumed to be confidential. The Arizona case, in
effect, states that a new artificial relation has been created by the
course of business, because the superior position of the banks
have reached the point where the relation consistently gives the
banks influence, and causes the client to repose confidence in them.
Thus, the decision is placed solidly on the reasons assigned as the
basis of the doctrine.
4 Dyrenforth v. Palmer Pneumatic Tire Co., 240 Ill. 25, 88 N. E. 290(1909).
5 Morrison v. Smith, iO ii. 304, 23 N. E. 241 (1889).
6 Robbins v. Bulter, 24 Ill. 387 (1860).
7 Gilmore v. Lee, 237 Ill. 402, 86 N. E. 568 (1908).
8 Huff v. Wolfe, 48 Il1. App. 589 (1892).
9 Facts held to justify finding a confidential relation in Southern Trust Co.
v. Lucas, 245 F. 286 (1917) ; Mears v. Accomac Banking Co., 160 Va. 311,
168 S. E. 740 (1933) ; Brasher v. First Nat. Bk. of Birmingham, 232 Ala.
340, 168 So. 42 (1936); Schweickhardt v. Chessen, 329 Ill. 637, 161 N. E.
118 (1928).
Facts were held insufficient to show relationship of confidence in Higgins
v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 312 Ill. 11, 143 N. E. 482 (1924) ; VanGundy
v. Steele, 261 Ill. 206, 103 N. E. 754 (1913) ; Gager v. Matthewson, 93 Conn.
539, 107 A. 1 (1919). See also 26 C. J. 1158 et seq., for discussion of entire
doctrine; and on fiduciaries in equity where the doctrine originated as the
outgrowth of the protection of incapacitated persons. See Kerr on Law of
Fraud and Mistake, p. 150 et. seq. Also Pomeroy's Equity (A. L. Bancroft
and Co., 1882), II, sec. 951.
10 312 Ill. 11, 143 N. E. 482 (1924). This is a reiteration of what
numerous other Illinois decisions set forth; Illinois courts have been par-
ticularly careful to keep this doctrine well defined and to avoid any limitation
on situations in which a confidential relation can be found as a matter of fact.
1 12 R. C. L. 235, sec. 5.
12 Smith v, Patterson, 33 Ohio St. 75 (1877).
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There is a decision,13 of an appellate court of Illinois which
is indirectly in conflict with the principal case. A representation
as alleged in the third count of the declaration would have been
actionable if a fiduciary relation had been held to exist. However,
there was a short, though pertinent dissenting opinion, and the
case has been hereinbefore criticized.' 4 A holding that there was
a confidential relationship on the facts presented would have
made the case more consistent with the Illinois decisions.
G. W. McGURN
JUDGMENT-OPENING OR VACATNG--TIME WHEN JUDGMENT
BECOWES FINAL UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE AcT.-Attention is called
to the recent case of Davis v. East St. Louis and Suburban Rail-
way Company,' in which the Appellate Court of Illinois held that
in accordance with the provision of the Civil Practice Act and the
Judgment Act, a judgment in the trial court becomes final, so
far as that court is concerned, thirty days after its rendition.
The original suit was filed February 10, 1933, the original decla-
ration on March 31, 1933, and the defendant's plea of the general
issue on April 4, 1933. The case was reversed by the Appellate
Court and, on the retrial, judgment was entered on the verdict
on May 25, 1936. On June 26, the defendant filed a motion to
vacate the judgment, the basis of which was newly discovered
evidence, but the motion was denied.
Inasmuch as the case was started before the Civil Practice Act
became effective the question was raised as to whether the
defendant's motion to vacate the judgment was controlled by
the provision of the Act and should have been filed within thirty
days after entry of the judgment, or whether it was subject to the
provision of the Statute as it existed prior to the adoption of
the Act, which permitted the filing of a motion to vacate a judg-
ment at any time before the close of the term.
According to the provisions2 of the Civil Practice Act the Court
might, in certain cases, within thirty days after entry of a judg-
ment or decree, set it aside. In order to adapt the Act to those
cases filed previous to its effective date, the Supreme Court
designated what cases were to be controlled by it by adopting
rule one, the latter part of which reads, "Except as provided
13 Wemple State Bank v. Continental Illinois Co., 279 Ill. App. 224
(1935) ; but see People ex rel. Nelson v. Rochelle Trust and Savings Bank,
275 Ill. App. 583 (1934).
14 13 CHICAGo-KENT REVIEW 359, particularly at p. 361.
1 290 Ill. App. 540, 9 N. E. (2d) 254 (1937).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 174 (7) ; Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 129 (1).
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by this rule, or by written stipulation of parties, or by order of
the court, upon notice and motion, proceedings instituted prior
to January 1, 1934, shall not be governed by the Civil Practice
Act. "8 The case would, therefore, come clearly under this pro-
vision, but the Court, holding that the judgment was final, stated
that the judgment was controlled by the Judgment Act which
provides that, "Hereafter every judgment, decree or order, final
in its nature, of any court of record in any civil or criminal pro-
ceeding shall have the same force and effect as a conclusive
adjudication upon the expiration of thirty days from the date of
its rendition as, under the law heretofore in force, it has had upon
the expiration of the term of court at which it was rendered." 4
C. E. HACKLANDER
MORTGAGES-DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS--PROPORTIONATE SHARE
IN SECURITY OF CREDITOR BONDHOLDERS IN RELATION TO TOTAL
BONDS PLEDGED WITH TRUSTEE.-In The First National Bank of
Ottawa v. Kay Bee Company,1 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that in the foreclosure of a trust deed the creditors are entitled
to share in the security in the proportion that their mortgage
bonds bore to the total bonds pledged with the trustee rather than
in proportion to the amount of the debts secured by the bonds.
In October of 1932, the Kay Bee Company was indebted to the
First National Bank of Ottawa and also to the Smith Trust &
Savings Bank of Morrison, Illinois, and each of the creditors held
notes for the indebtedness. On the 29th, the company delivered
a trust deed to the Ottawa bank as trustee, thereby conveying
certain real estate to secure payment of fifty thousand dollars
evidenced by two bearer bonds, each for twenty-five thousand
dollars. There was no priority between these two bonds. To
secure the debts then owing, as well as any loans that might be
made in the future, the company pledged note number one to the
Ottawa bank and note number two to the Morrison bank. The
company defaulted in the payment of interest due, and the
Ottawa bank as trustee began foreclosure. At that time the
Ottawa bank held notes of the company aggregating twenty-four
thousand dollars. The Morrison bank held notes amounting to
about sixteen thousand dollars. The foreclosure was allowed and
the court issued an order of sale to satisfy the indebtedness. The
3 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 259.1; Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, ff 223, Rule 1.
4 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 77, § 82; Ill. State Bar Stats.
(1935), Ch. 110, ff 268 (1).
1 366 I1. 202, 7 N. E. (2d) 860 (1937).
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decree further ordered that if the sum realized from the sale
should be insufficient to pay the amount of the notes plus interest,
then the master should distribute the fund to the two creditors in
the proportion that the amount due each bank bore to the total
due both banks.
Under this arrangement the Morrison bank would get approx-
imately two-fifths of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. It con-
tended that it should get one-half-that is to say, the proportion
of the fund which the bond it held bore to the total amount of the
bonds outstanding. The Appellate Court 2 affirmed the order of
the lower court. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decree
and ordered distribution according to the method urged by the
Morrison bank.
The contrary views of the two courts are explained by their
interpretations of Georgetown Water Company v. Fidelity Trust
& Safety Vault Company.3 The facts there were very similar to
the instant case, and upon foreclosure by the trustee, the situation
stood thus: the sureties, who had succeeded to the rights of the
water company, held fifty-four bonds of a par value of twenty-
seven thousand dollars to secure a debt of ten thousand dollars.
The machinery company held ten bonds at a par value of five
thousand dollars in payment of its debt of five thousand dollars.
The Kentucky court held that distribution should be made to
the bondholders in the proportion that their bonds bore to the
total of the bonds pledged, the rule adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court in the instant case.
The Appellate Court had distinguished the instant case from
the Georgetown Water Company case on the ground that the
machinery company was a purchaser for value while in this case
both banks held the bonds merely as collateral security for loans
already made, and were not, as to these amounts, purchasers for
value. Refusing this viewpoint, the Supreme Court stated: "One
who holds bonds pledged as collateral to secure the repayment of
a loan is, as to the extent of the primary debt, a bona fide pur-
chaser of the bonds, and in the enforcement of his rights is
entitled to like protection as a purchaser in due course." 4
The Appellate Court probably had in mind Bay v. Coddington5
2 First Nat. Bk. of Ottawa v. Kay Bee Co., 286 Ill. App. 546, 3 N. E.
(2d) 961 (1936).
3 117 Ky. 325, 78 S. W. 113 (1904).
4 At p. 205.
5 5 Johns. Ch. 54, 9 Am. Dec. 268 (1821). Chancellor Kent held that one
who took a note as collateral security for a pre-existing debt was not a
holder in due course. The true owner of the paper, whose agent had wrong-
fully pledged it, was allowed to recover.
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and the Supreme Court based its conclusion on Swift v. Tyson.
It is difficult to see the relation of those cases to this one, where
both holders took with full knowledge of all the facts. The dis-
pute is not between the maker and the holder of a bond. No
defense is sought to be raised by the maker, and his liability is
admitted. Nor is this the case where A, the debtor, pledges as
security a note for an amount greater than the debt, and B, the
pledgee, negotiates it for its face value to C, a bona fide pur-
chaser. The dispute is between the holders of two bonds; what
distribution should be made of the security pledged for their
protection.
However, the rule adopted by the Supreme Court gives effect
to what the parties probably intended. If an undivided one-half
interest in the land had been mortgaged directly to each creditor,
neither one could have claimed more than the proceeds from the
sale of his half interest. The intervention of the trustee in the
instant case could not change the result. Each creditor took a
bond representing half the security. The excess of the bond over
the debt must have been thought of as additional protection to
be looked to if the security depreciated in value. That is why one
who lends money usually insists upon collateral in excess of the
amount of the loan. If the ruling of the Appellate Court were
followed, this added protection, insisted upon by the Morrison
bank, would mean nothing. A preference would be given to the
Ottawa bank simply because its claim was the larger. The effect
would be that the worth of the collateral pledged to a creditor to
secure a series of notes would vary constantly with the amount of
notes pledged to other creditors, even though one creditor, more
conservative than the others, had, with their knowledge, insisted
upon a greater margin of safety.
R. ROB
MORTGAGES-PLEADINGS AND PROCESS-TRIAL BY JURY AS RIGHT
OF GUARANTOR WHO HAS BEEN JOINED AS PARTY DEFENDANT IN
FORECLOSURE ACTION. - The New York Court of Appeals in
Jamaica Savings Bank v. M. S. Investing Company, Incorporated,1
decided that in a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage and for a
deficiency decree the guarantors of the payment of the mortgage
debt have no constitutional right to try to a jury defenses which
6 16 Pet. 1, 41 U. S. 1, 10 L. Ed. 865 (1842). This case held that the
transfer of negotiable paper by endorsement to a creditor, as a security for a
pre-existing debt, was a transfer for value.
1 274 N. Y. 215, 8 N. E. (2d) 493 (1937).
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would release them if proved. 2 The New York Constitution pro-
vided that "The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been
heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever.' ' The guarantors
contended, and the minority opinion so argued, that because prior
to the act which permitted chancery courts to render deficiency
decrees in foreclosure proceedings the mortgagee could have pro-
ceeded against them only at law, in which event the guarantors
would be entitled to a trial by jury, their constitutional right to
such trial as to the issues raised should remain unimpaired.
The majority decided the case upon the ground that equity,
having obtained jurisdiction to foreclose the mortgage, will award
complete relief, although it may incidentally allow a remedy avail-
able originally in a court of law, and that in a proceeding in
equity there is no absolute right to trial by jury, even where, as
incidental to the main relief prayed for, the complaint seeks
money damages.
The Jamaica Savings Bank case and the decisions of the courts
of other states permitting joinder of guarantors and certain other
third persons in foreclosure proceedings are based upon statutes
which are sufficiently broad to include all persons subject to
liability in connection with the mortgage debt. 4 However, in the
absence of a statute giving that authority, a guarantor of the
mortgage debt cannot be joined in a proceeding to foreclose a
mortgage.5 In such a case he is not a proper party, and it follows
that no deficiency decree may be entered against him.
The Illinois Mortgages Act 6 is the source and prescribes the
extent of the authority of the chancery courts of Illinois to enter
deficiency decrees in foreclosure proceedings. Before the adoption
of section 16 of that act, our chancery courts had no such power,
because foreclosure proceedings were simply actions in rem
against the mortgaged property. 7
On the basis of the rulings in two Appellate Court cases, it
would seem that the decisions of the Illinois courts are contrary
to those of New York with respect to the propriety of joining the
2 Guarantors' answer alleged that without their consent plaintiff had
waived payment of an installment of interest, had extended time for payment
of principal, had changed interest dates and rate, and allowed mortgagor to
continue in default of payment of principal and interest.
3 N. Y. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 2 (1821).
4 Frank v. Davis, 135 N. Y. 275, 31 N. E. 1100 (1892) ; Titus v. Woods,
45 Cal. App. 541, 188 P. 68 (1920); Jarman v. Wiswall, 24 N. J. Eq. 267
(1873).
5 Hamill v. McCalla, 228 Ala. 281, 153 So. 412 (1934); Cottrell v. New
London Furniture Co., 94 Wis. 176, 68 N. W. 874 (1896).
6 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 95, 17.
7 Cotes v. Bennett, 183 Ill. 82, 55 N. E. 661 (1899).
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guarantor of the mortgage debt in a proceeding to foreclose a
mortgage. In Walsh v. Van Horn,8 a deficiency decree was en-
tered against Walsh, the mortgagee, who had assigned the mort-
gage and notes to Van Horn, and it was disputed whether Walsh
assumed the liability of an endorser or of a guarantor in the
transaction. The court held that section 16 of the Mortgages Act
did not authorize joinder of third persons legally liable for the
payment of the mortgage debt and that the statute authorizing
chancery courts to enter deficiency decrees against "the defend-
ant or defendants personally liable for the mortgage debt" has
reference only to such defendants personally liable for the debt as
are before the court for the purposes of foreclosure and upon
equitable grounds. The court further held that whether the
liability of Walsh for the payment of the note was that of endorser
or guarantor, it was a purely legal obligation distinct from that
embodied in the note as originally given or in the mortgage, and
that there was no element that would make it cognizable by a
chancery court. The Walsh case was followed in Christenson v.
Niedert.9
It appears that in Illinois prior to the adoption of the Civil
Practice Act,10 regardless of the constitutional question raised in
the Jamaica Savings Bank case, the guarantor could not be joined
in foreclosure proceedings and hence could not be made subject
to a deficiency decree therein. No case has as yet arisen in Illinois
on this point since the adoption of the Civil Practice Act. It
would seem, by virtue of section 24(1), 11 that the plaintiff might
join both mortgagor and guarantor as defendants in the one
suit in order to secure a "complete determination" of his rights
against both. But this section does not dispose of the question as
to the type of forum each defendant may demand. There is a
provision in section 23 of the Civil Practice Act 1 2 that the "court
may order separate trials," but this language appears to relate
only to joinder of plaintiffs and apparently does not contemplate
giving the different defendants, so joined, separate tribunals. This
confusion must, therefore, remain insoluble until the Illinois
courts have passed on the problem.
In Turnes v. Brenkle,13 the statute under consideration created
the right to establish a mechanic's lien by a proceeding in
s 22 Ill. App. 170 (1887).
9 259 Ill. App. 96 (1930).
10 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110.
11 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 152.
12 Ill. State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 1 151.
13 249 Ill. 394, 94 N. E. 495 (1911).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
chancery and further attempted to empower the chancellor, in
case he should find no right to a lien existed, to "render judgment
as at law for the amount which the contractor is entitled to." The
court held that the attempt to vest the chancellor with power to
"render judgment as at law" was a transfer to chancery of a
purely legal case-a contract case. It branded the statute as
unconstitutional partly upon the ground that litigants may not,
by a mere transfer of purely legal cases to a court of chancery,
be deprived of the constitutional right to trial by jury as to mat-
ters wherein such right existed at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, and that even should the chancellor exercise his
discretion to grant such trial, this would not satisfy the constitu-
tional guaranty because of the fact that in chancery the verdict
of the jury is merely advisory and is not binding on the
chancellor.
In view of a provision in the Illinois Constitution of 1870,14
similar to that of New York quoted above, and the earlier de-
cisions of the Illinois courts previously mentioned, it would appear
that, in order to give a construction to section 24 of the Civil
Practice Act which would render it constitutional, the question
might be decided differently in this state.
B. P. MORISSETTE
PARTIES--INTERVENTION-EFFECT OF CIVIL PRACTICE ACT ON
RUimS oF EquiTY.-The Civil Practice Act has not changed the
general rules of equity as to the right to intervene, the Illinois
Supreme Court decided in Hairgrove v. City of Jacksonvizle.1
That case involved a representative suit brought by a taxpayer
to enjoin the City of Jacksonville from constructing and operat-
ing a municipal electric light and power plant, as proposed by city
ordinance. The city answered the complaint. On the following
day the appellant, Illinois Power and Light Corporation, holding
a franchise to supply electric service in the city, was allowed to
intervene as a party plaintiff and to file an amendment to the
original complaint, making additional parties defendants and
adding new issues. The defendant thereafter made a motion to
vacate the order allowing intervention, which motion was granted.
A second motion was then made by appellant for leave to join
as a party plaintiff, to add new allegations to the complaint sim-
ilar to those contained in the prior amendment, and to make new
parties defendant. The appellant relied on the ground that the
plaintiff did not bring his suit in good faith but in collusion with
14 Art. II, Sec. 5.
1 366 IMI. 163, 8 N. E. (2d) 187 (1937).
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the attorneys for the city. This motion was denied. On appeal
from such action it was held that the trial court had decided cor-
rectly in denying such motion, since the provisions of the Civil
Practice Act concerning joinder of parties had not changed the
former practice as to the right to intervene.
The appellant argued it was not seeking to intervene, but
merely to exercise its right to join as a plaintiff in a representative
suit under section 232 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, and, hav-
ing a right to become a party plaintiff under section 23, it then
had the right to raise new issues and join new parties under sec-
tions 26,3 33,4 44,5 and 466 of that act.
Generally, when a representative suit is brought, those who are
in the class may join on application, but must usually adopt the
suit as they find it and cannot control the original plaintiff's prose-
cution therof.7 It has, however, been held in England8 under a
practice provision somewhat similar to that of Illinois9 that
any person in the class may dispute the original plaintiff's claim
of right to represent him, and in such case the individual so
contending should be joined as a defendant. Had the appellant
so sought in the instant case, its request would probably have been
granted, and it could then have filed an answer by way of
counterclaim under section 38 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.'0
Under the facts of the case in question, the court held that
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 147; Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, ff 151.
"Subject to rules, all persons may join in one action as plaintiffs, in whom
any right to rehet in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in
the alternative, where if such persons had brought separate actions any com-
mon question of law or fact would arise: Provided, that if upon the applica-
tion of any party it shall appear that such joinder may embarrass or delay
the trial of the action, the court may order separate trials or make such order
as may be expedient, and judgment may be given for such one or more of
the plaintiffs as may be found to be entitled to relief, for the relief to which
he or they may be entitled.
"If any one who is a necessary plaintiff declines to join, he may be made
a defendant, the reason therefor being stated in the complaint."
8 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 150; Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 154.
4 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 157; Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 161.
5 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 168; Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 1 172.
6 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 170; Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 174.
7 47 C. J., 52, 53.
8 See Nelson v. Church, 9 Ch. Div. 552, on p. 559 (1878).
o England, Order 16, Rule 11, The Annual Practice, 1937, p. 257.
10 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 162. Ill. State Bar
Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 166.
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what was sought by the appellant was intervention in the pro-
ceedings to which it was not an original party, rather than a mere
joinder in a representative suit. Intervention has been defined
as a proceeding by which one not originally made a party to an
action or suit is permitted, on his own application, to appear and
join one of the original parties in maintaining his cause of action
or defense, or to assert some cause of action in favor of the
intervenor against some or all of the parties to the proceeding as
originally instituted." But under the general rules of equity, the
right to intervene was not an absolute right; it was one granted or
denied, depending upon the circumstances surrounding each case
and the rules applicable thereto. Moreover, the interest which
would entitle a person to intervene in a suit between other parties
must have been in the matter in litigation, and it must have been
of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor would
either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment or decree. The mere fact that the enforcement of the
decree when rendered might benefit or prejudice the applicant
for intervention would not entitle him to intervene if its effect
were indirect.'2 There has been some conflict of authority as to
whether or not a private power plant has such a "direct interest"
as would entitle it to intervene.' 3 The court in the instant case,
without discussion, apparently assumed that the appellant had no
such direct interest.
There is another rule that since the right to intervene, where
not governed by statute, is not an absolute but a discretionary
right, it might be denied where intervention would result in
injecting into the pending suit issues which would unduly compli-
cate the case.' 4 Further the intervenor must take the suit as he
11 Note to Walker v. Sanders, 103 Minn. 124, 114 N. W. 649, 123 Am. St.
Rep. 276 (1908).
12 Leland v. Leland, 319 Ill. 426, 150 N. E. 270 (1926); Bossert v.
Granary Creek Union Drainage Dist. No. 1, 307 Ill. 425, 138 N. E. 726
(1923) ; Chicago & W. I. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 294 Il1. 257, 128 N. E.
462 (1920); Wightman v. Evanston Yaryan Co., 217 Ill. 371, 75 N. E. 502(1905).
18 It has been held on a somewhat similar situation that a private corpora-
tion furnishing power and light in a municipality has such an interest in the
subject matter as to entitle it to predicate litigation thereon. See Kansas
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Independence, Kansas, 79 F. (2d) 32 (1935),
rehearing denied 79 F. (2d) 638. Contra, Northwestern Light & Power Co.
v. Town of Milford, Iowa, 82 F. (2d) 45 (1936), rehearing denied 82 F.
(2d) 1023; Greenwood County, S. C. v. Duke Power Co., 81 F. (2d) 986
(1936) ; Interstate Power Co. v. City of Cushing, 12 F. Supp. 806 (1935).
'4 Wightman v. Evanston Yaryan Co., 217 Ill. 371, 75 N. E. 502 (1905) ;
Houston Real Estate Investment Co. v. Hechler, 44 Utah 64, 138 P. 1159
(1914).
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finds it, may neither change the issues between the parties nor
raise new ones, may not insist upon a change in the form of
procedure, and may not delay trial.15 It should be noted, however,
that this rule has been generally construed to mean that he cannot
avail himself of, or urge, mere irregularities in the proceeding
which the original parties have expressly or impliedly waived, nor
avail himself of defenses which are personal to them.16 The court
dismissed any consideration of this point by its assumption that
the appellant had no direct interest in the outcome of the suit. If
it had considered the question, it well might have found that the
appellant's proposed amendments would have "unduly" com-
plicated the case.
Hence, based on the assumption that the appellant did not have
an immediate interest in the subject matter of the suit and was
seeking to inject burdensome issues into a pending suit, the de-
cision denying leave to intervene was proper under the general
rules of equity which existed prior to the Civil Practice Act.
The Civil Practice Act nowhere expressly treats of the right
of intervention. Section 25, 17 concerning the joinder of parties
after the inception of suit, was interpreted in the recent Illinois
case of Bernero v. Bernero,18 cited by the court in the instant
case, and it was there construed as limited to cases where a com-
plete determination of the controversy could not be had without
the presence of other parties. The court there stated, ". . . but
it [section 25] says nothing about intervention, and, so far as we
can see, adds nothing to the existing law on that subject." And,
in the instant case, the court adds, "The same may be said of
other sections of the Civil Practice Act cited. We are of the
opinion they do not change the rule as to right to intervene."
The decisions in the Bernero case and in the present case are
supported by the strikingly analogous New York case of Yonkers
15 Wightman v. Evanston Yaryan Co., 217 Ill. 371, 75 N. E. 502 (1905).
16 Note to Walker v. Sanders, 103 Minn. 124, 114 N. W. 649 (1908), at
p. 292; 20 R. C. L. 692.
17 "Where a complete determination of the controversy cannot be had
without the presence of other parties, the court may direct them to be
brought in. Where a person, not a party, has an interest or title which the
judgment may affect, the court, on application, shall direct him to be made
a party..... " Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, § 149; I1.
State Bar Stats. (1935), Ch. 110, 153.
18 363 I1. 328, 2 N. E. (2d) 317 (1936). In this case the Retirement
Board of Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago was held not
entitled to intervene in a proceeding by the divorced wife of a fireman to set
aside a divorce decree after the fireman's death on the ground of fraud,
since the interest of the Retirement Board was not direct or immediate in the
subject matter of the proceeding.
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Railroad Company v. City of Yonkers,19 where a bus company,
which had submitted bids for a bus route, was denied leave to
intervene in a suit by a taxpayer to restrain the city from award-
ing consents for operation of motorbuses under a city ordinance,
on the ground that, while the bus company was interested in the
question to be decided, it was neither a necessary nor proper
party and was not shown to be in the category of a person
entitled to intervene. 20 This decision, supporting the action of
the court in the instant case, is entitled to more weight than
merely persuasive authority, inasmuch as the provisions of the
Illinois act are based substantially on those of New York.
2 1
S. ZIBLAT
PLEADING--TIME FOR FILING--POWER OF COURT TO GRANT ADDI-
TIONAL TIME TO FILE REPLY AFTER PERIOD PROVIDED BY CIVIL
PRACTICE ACT HAS PASSED.-In Conour v. Zimmerly et al.,' the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that the Civil Practice Act 2 does
not change the rule prevalent before its adoption that it was
within the discretion of the court to grant time within which
to plead. The plaintiff had failed to file a reply to new matter
contained in the answer within twenty days as provided by the
act,3 and thereafter the plaintiff filed a motion, supported by
affidavit, asking that his default be vacated and that he be given
leave to plead, which motion was granted, the court holding that
such a matter was within its discretion. It is to be noted that in
addition to the above ground, which supports the court's decision
19 217 N. Y. S. 685 (1926).
20 The applicant for intervention in the Yonkers R. Co. case, supra,
relied on Section 193, Subdivisions 1 and 3, of the New York Civil Practice
Act, which are equivalent to Section 25 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.
The text of Section 193 of the New York Civil Practice Act is as follows:
"1. The court may determine the controversy as between the parties before
it where it can do so without prejudice to the rights of others or by saving
their rights; but where a complete determination of the controversy cannot
be had without the presence of other parties the court must direct them to
be brought in.
"3. Where a person not a party to the action has an interest in the subject
thereof, or in real property the title to which may in any manner be affected
by the judgment, or in real property for injury to which the complaint
demands relief, and makes application to the court to be made a party, it
must direct him to be brought in by the proper amendment."
Cahill's New York Civil Practice (7th ed.), p. 100.
21 0. L. McCaskill, Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated (1933), p. 41.
1 290 Ill. App. 546, 9 N. E. (2d) 61 (1937).
2 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 110.
3 Supreme Court Rules, rule 8 (3); Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935),
Ch. 110, § 259.8 (3).
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on principle, there is a provision in the Civil Practice Act to the
effect that a judge, for good cause shown, on special notice to the
opposite party, may extend the time for putting in any pleading
or the doing of any act which is required by the rules to be done,
within a limited time, not only before but even after the expira-
tion of the time.4
E. J. MEDLIN
SALES-MODIFICATION OF AGREEMENT-SHOULD UNPAID SELL-
ER's LIEN REvIvE ON BUYER'S RETURN OF GOODS WITH REQUEST
FOR FULL CREDIT DESPITE DETERIORATION ?-The Illinois Appellate
Court for the second district has recently held, in Excelsior Stove
and Manufacturing Company v. Venturelli,' that where the
defendant had returned stoves purchased from the plaintiff, re-
questing by letter that their purchase price be applied against
the defendant's indebtedness, the plaintiff, after paying the
freight, uncrating the stoves, placing them in his stock, and
holding them five months without notifying the defendant that
his offer was not accepted, was then entitled, over objection, to
credit defendant with less than their purchase price.
An offeree is not generally bound to make reply to an unsolic-
ited offer, and his silence or inaction cannot be construed as
assent to such offer, lacking circumstances, such as prior course
of dealing between the parties, which raise a duty on his part to
answer.2 But any act of the buyer which he would have no right
to do if he were not the owner of the goods may be construed to
be acceptance.8
If the offer is accepted it must be accepted exactly as made, for
any deviations between offer and acceptance prevents the forma-
tion of a contract, and lacking a contract no rights can arise there-
under.4 If, therefore, the plaintiff in the instant case did accept
the defendant's offer of the stoves, it must have been on the con-
ditions stated in defendant's offer-that defendant be credited
with their purchase price.
4 Supreme Court Rules, rule 8 (5) ; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935),
Ch. 110, § 259.8 (5).
1 290 Ill. App. 502, 8 N. E. (2d) 702 (1937).
2
.Williston on Contracts (Rev. Ed., 1936), I, § 91, and cases there cited.
See also 55 C. J. 96, and Wolf Co. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 252 Ill.
491, 96 N. E. 1063 (1911).
8 Wolf Co. v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 252 Ill. 491, 96 N. E. 1063
(1911) ; Hall v. Bergschneider, 265 Ill. App. 118 (1932).
4 Standard Growers Exchange, Inc. v. Bredehoft, 227 Ill. App. 72 (1922);
Maclay v. Harvey, 90 Ill. 525 (1878) ; Middaugh v. Stough, 161 Ill. 312, 43
N. E. 1061 (1896); Davis v. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 208 I1. 375, 70 N. E.
359 (1904).
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If the plaintiff did not accept the defendant's offer, then he had
no right in the stoves except as bailee, unless by reason of a
seller's lien. The sales statute provides that an unpaid seller
loses his lien "when the buyer or his agent lawfully obtains pos-
session of the goods.' '5 The decision seems to intimate that in this
case the lien, lost when possession of the stoves passed to the
defendant, came back to the plaintiff, along with the stoves, when
defendant returned them, as in the case of stoppage in transitu.
However, before a bona fide stoppage in transitu can be effected,
the buyer must have been insolvent6 which may or may not have
been the situation in this case,7 and the goods must not have
been received by the buyer or his agent." Should it be granted
that an unpaid seller's lien had revested in the plaintiff with his
new possession of the stoves, he might, of course, exercise that
lien by rescission,9 or by sale of the goods,10 and an action for
his damages.
No Illinois case is found, however, except those involving stop-
page in transitu, which holds that a seller's lien, once lost, is
regained by the seller regaining possession of the goods, and as
stated, stoppage in transitu can be exercised only before the
goods come into the buyer's possession.
It would seem, therefore, that plaintiff's rights in the goods
were dependent upon whether or not he accepted the defendant's
offer. If he did accept, either intentionally or by implication, it
must have been in accordance with the terms of the offer. If he
did not accept the offer there was no contract, and he had no
property in the goods and no right to appropriate them to his own
use, without the defendant's consent, at any price.
L. WHiDDEN
WITNESSEs-ATTNDANCE AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER Ex-
PERT WITNESS Is GUILTY OF CONTEMPT FOR ]REFUSING TO TESTIFY
UNTIL PAID MORE THAN ORDINARY WITNESS FEE.-In Swope v.
State et al.1 a roentgenologist was held guilty of contempt of
court for refusing to testify as to the significance of certain
x-ray plates until he had been paid at the trial, as agreed, a fee
5 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 121Y2, § 56(b).
6 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 121Y2, § 57.
7 The buyer must also have been insolvent before the unpaid seller, in pos-
session of the goods as agent or bailee of the buyer, may exercise an unpaid
seller's lien.
8 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 121Y2, § 58(a).
9 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 121Y2, § 61.
10 Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. (1935), Ch. 1212, § 60.
1 67 P. (2d) 416 (Kan., 1937).
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of $25.00 for testifying, which amount was greatly in excess of
the ordinary witness fee prescribed by statute.
Although the decision cites and follows the holding of an
Illinois Supreme Court case decided in 1897,2 so that our law
is apparently the same, it involves an interesting question. The
defendant's argument was that by coming to court to testify he
lost a day of his time and consequent earnings which the ordinary
witness fee would not approach which resulted in his being
deprived of his property without due process of law. The court
pointed out that there was no violation of the due process clause
in that the witness had not been called upon to render any service,
but merely to testify as to what he had done and observed, and
that at the time he refused to testify no questions calling for
expert opinion had been asked him.
There remained the question as to whether it was equitable in
principle that a highly trained man capable of earning $100 a day
in his profession or business should, when called as an expert
witness, receive the same fee that would be paid a laborer who
could earn only $2.00 a day.
If such a condition is unfair it should be remedied by statute.
But although in England a scale of fees for witnesses is in effect
which seems to adjust the fee to the social importance of the wit-
ness and provides for an amount to be paid "gentlemen" for
"refreshment, "3 there seems to be no statutory grading of witness
fees in this country. On the contrary it seems consistent with our
theory of government, as stated in the instant case, to hold that
each citizen owes the duty of aiding in the settlement of contro-
versies, and that when, as here, a witness makes no special prepa-
ration, but is called upon only to testify as to what he knows,
though in the business world his opinion would be more valuable
than that of another citizen, each giving up his day in fulfillment
of that duty, he should be held equal in the eye of the law to
any other.
To follow the order of gradation of witness fees to its logical
conclusion would, as has been suggested 4 result in only the rich
having expert witnesses because of the inability of poor litigants
to pay the set fee, which is not in accordance with the ideas of
equality upon which the United States is founded.
L. WmDFN
2 Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N. E. 108 (1897).
3 Annual Practice (1937), pp. 1894-5.
4 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed., 1923), IV, 680, § 2203.
